How viable is the resolution of nuclear non-proliferation disputes through the International Court of Justice and international arbitration? James Fry examines the compromissory clauses in the IAEA Statute, IAEA safeguards agreements and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material that give jurisdiction to these fora and analyzes recent jurisprudence to demonstrate how legal resolution can handle such politically sensitive disputes. In sum, legal resolution of nuclear non-proliferation disputes represents an option that States and commentators have all too often ignored. The impartiality and procedural safeguards of legal resolution should make it an acceptable option for target States and the international community, especially vis-à-vis the procedural shortcomings and general heavy-handedness of Security Council involvement under the UN Charter Chapter VII. 
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The problem and solution
In a dramatic exchange within the Security Council during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, US ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson asked USSR ambassador to the UN Valerian Zorin point-blank whether the USSR had placed in Cuba missiles capable of carrying out a nuclear attack on the United States, to which Zorin sneered that he was not in a courtroom and that he did not appreciate being interrogated as if in a courtroom. 1 Stevenson retorted that Zorin was in the "courtroom of world opinion" and that he was prepared to provide evidence of such missiles as if in a courtroom, after which he presented evidence of intelligence photographs of the missile sites in courtroom-like fashion.
2
Apart from its rhetorical value, was there any significance to Stevenson's reference to the Security Council as a courtroom and to his procedural formalism? Some commentators assert that fairness and legitimacy depend partly on the procedures followed during a decision-making process, with legal resolution providing a better quality process vis-à-vis that of the Security Council on account of legal resolution's structural impartiality and due-process safeguards.
3 A desire on the part of Stevenson to improve the perceived fairness and legitimacy of those proceedings conceivably could have been the reason behind his words and actions in this case. Regardless, this suggests that problems with resolving nuclear non-proliferation disputes could arise partly out of shortcomings in the process, with the procedures of legal resolution improving on those shortcomings, thus presumably increasing the chances that the disputant State(s) respect the final determination. At the same time, Zorin's response reflects the relatively common notion that legal resolution is inappropriate with politically sensitive disputes. 4 This study attempts to reconcile these two conflicting notions in exploring the possibility of legal resolution of nuclear non-proliferation disputes. Given how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and international arbitral tribunals can find jurisdiction through compromissory clauses in nuclear non-proliferation agreements and the favorable jurisprudence on justiciability, legal resolution represents an option for States trying to resolve their nuclear non-proliferation disputes. Given the destructive potential of war, especially nuclear war, and the shortcomings of the Security Council's decision-making process when it comes to its Chapter VII measures, States should see legal resolution as a somewhat attractive option in terms of the procedural fairness it provides. This study represents an invitation to States to further consider legal resolution as an option with nuclear non-proliferation disputes.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of the most important treaty regimes in existence, inasmuch as nuclear weapons possess the capability to end modern civilization as we know it. This regime also seems to be one of the most fragile, with any one State's noncompliance having the potential to unravel the entire regime.
5 Combine this fragility with the relative regularity of noncompliance (although at times minor), 6 and it is not difficult to see international peace and security as 4 See ch. 6.5 infra. rules of international law that would allow the unilateral use of force against would-be proliferators, which has not helped the situation. 9 In an apparent attempt to alleviate tensions and resolve the matter, the Security Council occasionally has intervened. However, the Security Council's heavy-handed method of imposing and enforcing obligations through its UN Charter Chapter VII powers might have exacerbated the situation, arguably leading some target States to further recalcitrance. The stage is set to explore new alternatives that might help avoid war over these kinds of disputes. As Albert Einstein once said, "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." Nobel laureate and former director-general of the IAEA Mohamed ElBaradei concludes his recent book by asserting, "The final reason not to lose faith that diplomacy and dialogue can prevail as the strategy for dealing with nuclear crises is based on a point of logic: the alternative is unacceptable."
10 The "alternative" to diplomatic resolution that ElBaradei referred to was nuclear war.
11 This study emphasizes a third alternative distinct from diplomatic resolution and nuclear war -a new "mode of thinking" with nuclear non-proliferation disputes -by proposing legal resolution as an option, especially in the face of war, on the one hand, and coercive Security Council measures, on the other. The cover art of this book captures the essence of its thesis, with Roman general Gaius Marius disarming the soldier that had been sent to kill him through his legal authority, as opposed to his physical strength. Likewise, the legal authority of the ICJ and international arbitral tribunals might be a crucial element in helping resolve nuclear nonproliferation disputes, as opposed to the realpolitik of the Security Council and war. Admittedly, this study is not unique in asserting that legal resolution can become a more attractive option in the face of coercive action.
12 Nor is this study unique in believing that all disputes can be peacefully resolved, with the determining factor being finding the right method of resolution and the appropriate incentives for those particular actors in that particular situation. 13 This study is highly unique, however, in its application of these ideas to arguably the most politically sensitive disputes. In an era that some commentators characterize with the belief that even the most difficult problems can be solved, 14 the time is now ripe to test that notion with regard to legal resolution of nuclear nonproliferation disputes, thereby pushing the current boundaries of the legal literature. To be clear, while previous studies have explored how to interpret nuclear non-proliferation agreements, 15 this study explores who should be allowed to interpret such agreements, or, to be more specific, whether the ICJ and international arbitral tribunals ought to be given the opportunity to resolve disputes over these agreements before the Security Council gets involved with its Chapter VII powers.
Outline
This study is divided into four parts broken into seven chapters. Part I provides this relatively short introduction to the study (Chapter 1), as well as an introduction to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an introduction to international dispute settlement generally (Chapter 2), all of which sets the foundation and framework for the substance of the study. Part II (comprising Chapter 3) elaborates on the problem alluded to in the preceding section with regard to Security Council involvement 12 See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, Judicial Procedures Relating to the Use of Force, 31 Va. J.
Int'l L. 249, 268 (1991). 13 See, e.g., Manfred Lachs, The Law and the Settlement of International Disputes, in Dispute Settlement through the United Nations 283, 286 (K. Venkata Raman ed., 1977). 14 See A $300 Idea that Is Priceless, The Economist, April 30, 2011, at 66 (asserting that this is an era when the dominant belief is that even the most difficult problems can be solved). 15 See, e.g., Daniel H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (2011) (providing an in-depth analysis of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
with nuclear non-proliferation disputes under UN Charter Chapter VII. Indeed, States and the international community might prefer to use force when trying to remove the nuclear-weapon capabilities of allegedly noncompliant and recalcitrant States; alternatively, they might prefer to create a strong incentive for those States by using coercive language in Security Council decisions, or even imposing enforcement measures such as sanctions and the authorization of force. 16 The dangers of war are obvious, especially when nuclear weapons are involved. 17 This is particularly true when the notorious three fallacies of nuclear war are allowed to increase the chances of nuclear war happening: "1. That nuclear war is not really going to happen or, if so, then only to other people. 2. That nothing can be done to prevent nuclear war except, perhaps, by someone else . . . 3. That nuclear war can be averted by further armament, unyielding threats etc."
18 Instead of focusing on war, however, Part II focuses on the more subtle dangers of Security Council involvement in terms of the perceived flaws in the Security Council's procedures in adopting its Chapter VII measures.
Chapter 3 undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Security Council involvement, under Chapter VII, with nuclear non-proliferation disputes, including those disputes involving India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Critics will be quick to assert that many, if not all, of those problems over nuclear non-proliferation are policy oriented and that policy-oriented solutions, not legal solutions, are needed in order to resolve these policy-oriented tensions. In other words, critics will argue that these are the exact situations where the ICJ and international arbitral tribunals cannot get involved, but where the Security Council should have, and does have, exclusive competence vis-à-vis the ICJ and international arbitral tribunals as the entity charged with maintaining international peace and security. One example of a policy-related problem is the West's policy of not allowing Iran to develop its civilian
